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Abstract
Shill bidding occurs when fake bids are introduced into an auction on the seller’s
behalf in order to artificially inflate the final price. This is typically achieved by
the seller having friends bid in her auctions, or the seller controls multiple fake
bidder accounts that are used for the sole purpose of shill bidding. We previously
proposed a reputation system referred to as the Shill Score that indicates how
likely a bidder is to be engaging in price inflating behaviour with regard to a
specific seller’s auctions. A potential bidder can observe the other bidders’ Shill
Scores, and if they are high, the bidder can elect not to participate as there
is some evidence that shill bidding occurs in the seller’s auctions. However, if
a seller is in collusion with other sellers, or controls multiple seller accounts,
she can spread the risk between the various sellers and can reduce suspicion on
the shill bidder. Collusive seller behaviour impacts one of the characteristics
of shill bidding the Shill Score is examining, therefore collusive behaviour can
reduce a bidder’s Shill Score. This paper extends the Shill Score to detect shill
bidding where multiple sellers are working in collusion with each other. We
propose an algorithm that provides evidence of whether groups of sellers are
colluding. Based on how tight the association is between the sellers and the
level of apparent shill bidding is occurring in the auctions, each participating
bidder’s Shill Score is adjusted appropriately to remove any advantages from
seller collusion. Performance has been tested using simulated auction data and
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experimental results are presented.
Key words: Shill bidding, online auctions, Shill Score, collusion, auction
simulation
1. Introduction
Online auction fraud can take various forms, including (but not limited to)
misrepresenting an item for sale, failing to pay for or deliver goods, selling black
market items, and bid shielding [8, 17, 22]. Shill bidding is a fraudulent activity
whereby a seemingly innocent bidder (i.e., a shill bidder) uses fake bids to drive
up the auction’s price for the seller’s benefit. The seller can have her friends
operate as shill bidders, and/or can register multiple bidder accounts for the sole
intention to submit shill bids. Such behaviour disadvantages legitimate bidders
as they are forced to pay more for an item in order to win the auction. Shill
bidding is not permitted by commercial online auctioneers, and severe penalties
can be incurred by those caught engaging in shill bidding [17, 29].
In March 2001, a U.S. court charged three men for their participation in a
ring of fraudulent bidding in hundreds of art auctions on eBay [17]. The men
created more than 40 eBay user accounts using false registration information.
The fraudsters gave themselves away when it was discovered that the items were
misrepresented as being of greater value. Furthermore, suspicion was raised
when unrealistically high shill bids were placed. These two factors provided
a firm case for prosecutors. A more recent case occurred during 2010 in the
UK [29]. A man used two eBay accounts. The first account was used to list
a minibus for sale. He then used the second account to submit fake bids in
the auction to inflate the price. The man also misrepresented the minibus by
illegally reducing its mileage. He was fined £5,000 under newly introduced laws
designed to combat shill bidding. These two cases highlight that shill bidders
can get caught and prosecuted. However, if it were not for the misrepresentation
and excessive prices, would the perpetrators have been detected?
Commercial online auctioneers claim to monitor their auctions for shill bid-
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ding activity, but are reluctant to disclose their techniques. eBay’s feedback
reputation system does not extend to shill bidding. The only means of recourse
for a bidder that suspects she is a victim of shill bidding is to contact the auc-
tioneer. Shill bidding detection is a relatively new area in academic literature
(see [1-5, 18-20]). We proposed a solution that observes bidding patterns over
a series of auctions for a particular seller, looking for typical shill bidding be-
havior [18]. The goal is to obtain statistics regarding a bidder’s conduct, and
deduce a measure called a Shill Score. The Shill Score indicates the likelihood
that a bidder is engaging in shill behaviour. A bidder is given a value between
0 and 10. The closer the Shill Score is to 10, the more likely that the bidder
has engaged in shill-like price inflating behaviour. The Shill Score targets core
strategies that a shill bidder follows. A shill bidder that deviates too far from
these characteristics is less effective, and will not significantly alter the auction
outcome for the seller. The Shill Score’s reputation-based approach acts as both
a detection mechanism and a deterrent to shill bidders. To avoid detection, a
shill must behave like a normal bidder, which in effect stops her from shilling.
We also extended the Shill Score in later work to detect collusive shill bidding
(i.e., where a seller has multiple shill bidders in an auction) [19, 20]. Colluding
shill bidders can engage in more sophisticated strategies in an attempt to reduce
suspicion.
In the first of the aforementioned real world shill bidding cases, three sellers
were in collusion. In other situations a single seller might be operating under
several aliases (i.e., multiple seller accounts). The purpose for taking such an
approach is to reduce the suspicion on any particular seller (or shill bidder) by
distributing the risk of shill bidding and making it less noticeable. Collusive
seller behaviour can influence elements of the Shill Score. None of the shill
detection techniques in the literature specifically target using multiple seller ac-
counts to engage in shill bidding. In this paper, we examine data from multiple
sellers for signs of seller collusion, and determine which sellers are hosting auc-
tions with suspicious shill behaviour (referred to as multiple seller collusive shill
bidding). The algorithm firstly identifies potential groups of colluding sellers.
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The degree of the association between the each member in the suspect collud-
ing group is then determined to provide evidence regarding how suspicious the
group is. A modified Shill Score is calculated for a bidder across each suspect
seller’s auctions. If the collective Shill Scores for the bidder across all sellers are
sufficiently high, the original Shill Score is recalculated with an adjustment to
remove the advantage of engaging in collusive seller behaviour. Performance has
been tested using simulated auction data and experimental results are presented.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the online auction
format and provides background on shill behaviour, the Shill Score, and ways
to detect collusive shill bidding. Section 3 defines the behaviour and strategies
multiple colluding sellers can use to engage in shill bidding, and presents an
algorithm to extend the Shill Score to account for colluding seller behaviour.
Section 4 shows how the proposed algorithm performs with simulated auction
data. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks and avenues for future work.
2. Online Auction Format, Shill Bidder Strategies, and Shill Detec-
tion
2.1. The Online Auction Format
The specific online auction format being investigated in this paper resembles
that of an eBay auction. The auction has a predetermined start and finish time.
Bidders submit bids at any stage between the start and finish time. Each newly
submitted bid must be higher than the previously submitted bid (i.e., greater
than or equal to a minimum bid increment specified by the auctioneer). When
two bids are received for the same value, the bid that arrived first is accepted.
The winner is the bidder with the highest bid once the auction terminates. The
winner must pay the seller the amount corresponding to the winning bid.
An auction’s bid history typically contains the following information for each
bid received:
< bid #, bidder id, time, bid amount >
4
Bid # is the number of the bid in the order of when it was received, bidder
id is the identity of the bidder submitting the bid, time is the time at which the
bid was received (typically down to the exact second), and bid amount is the
monetary value of the bid.
Note that there are some differences in how online auctioneers display their
bid histories. For example, eBay masks the bidder ids for all auctions over $200.
A bidders id is replaced by two random characters from her name and padded
out with *s (e.g., j*****y). There are also nuances related to automated bidding
(e.g., eBays Proxy Bidding, uBids Bid Butler). However, this paper assumes
that all bid history information is available (i.e., no bid masking) and that the
format is standardised (i.e., no automated bidding).
2.2. Shill Bidder Characteristics and Strategies
We refer to the most extreme competitive shill bidding strategy as aggressive
shilling [18]. An aggressive shill continually outbids everyone, thereby driving
up the price as much as possible. This strategy often results in the shill bidder
entering many bids.
In contrast, a shill bidder might only introduce an initial bid into an auction
where there have been no prior bids with the intent to stimulate bidding. This
behaviour is a common practice in traditional and online auctions. However,
most people typically do not consider it fraudulent. Nevertheless it is still shill
bidding, as it is an attempt to influence the price by introducing spurious bids.
We refer to this as benign shilling in the sense that the shill bidder does not
continue to further inflate the price throughout the remainder of the auction
[18]. A benign shill bidder will typically make a “one-off” bid at or near the
beginning of the auction.
To be effective, a shill bidder must comply with a particular strategy that
attempts to maximise the pay-off for the seller. We define aggressive shill bidders
to have the following characteristics [18]:
1. Bid exclusively in auctions only held by one particular seller. However, this
alone is not sufficient to incriminate a bidder. It may be the case that
5
the seller is the only supplier of an item the bidder is after, or that the
bidder really trusts the seller (usually based on the reputation of previous
dealings).
2. High bid frequency. An aggressive shill will continually outbid legitimate
bids to inflate the final price. Bids are typically placed until the seller’s
expected payoff for shilling has been reached, or until the shill risks winning
the auction (e.g., near the termination time or during slow bidding).
3. Few or no winnings for the auctions participated in (as the shill’s goal is to
lose).
4. Bid within a small time period after a legitimate bid. Generally a shill wants
to give legitimate bidders as much time as possible to submit a new bid
before the auction’s closing time.
5. Bid the minimum amount required to outbid a legitimate bidder. If the
shill bids an amount that is much higher than the current highest bid, it
is unlikely that a legitimate bidder will submit any more bids and the shill
will win the auction.
6. Bid more near the beginning of the auction. A shill’s goal is to try and
stimulate bidding, by bidding early a shill can influence the entire auction
process compared to a subset of it. Furthermore, bidding towards the end
of an auction is risky as the shill could accidentally win.
Regardless of the strategy employed (i.e., aggressive or benign), a shill will
still be a bidder that often trades with a specific seller but has not won any
auctions. Another factor that affects a shill bidder’s strategy is the value of the
current bid in relation to the reserve price (i.e., a price specified by the seller
as being the minimum value for which s/he will accept for the sale to proceed).
For example, once bidding has reached the reserve price, it becomes more risky
to continue shilling. However, this is conditional on whether the reserve price
is a realistic valuation of the item that all bidders share.
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2.3. Shill Bidding Example
Table 1 illustrates an example auction with three bidders. Each bidder is
denoted as b1, b2, and b3 respectively. Bidders b1 and b3 are legitimate, whereas
b2 is a shill bidder. b2 engages in aggressive shill behaviour by outbidding a
legitimate bid by the minimal amount required to stay ahead and within a
small time period of the last bid. b2’s bids force the other bidders to enter
higher bids in order to win. If b2 was not participating in this auction, b1 would
have only needed to pay $21 in order to win. Instead, b2 caused b1 to pay $33,
thus the shill has inflated the price by $12.
Table 1: An example auction with one shill bidder inflating the price for the seller.
Bid # bid Price Time
15 b1 $33 20:03
14 b2 (Shill) $32 12:44
13 b1 $31 12:42
12 b2 (Shill) $26 5:05
11 b1 $25 5:02
10 b2 (Shill) $21 2:47
9 b3 $20 2:45
8 b2 (Shill) $15 1:07
7 b1 $14 1:05
6 b2 (Shill) $9 0:47
5 b3 $8 0:45
4 b2 (Shill) $6 0:20
3 b3 $5 0:19
2 b2 (Shill) $2 0:06
1 b1 $1 0:05
In this example, b2 exhibits the typical shill behaviour described above. This
is evidenced by: (i) High frequency of bids (i.e., b2 has submitted more bids than
both the other bidders); (ii) Has not won the auction despite the high number
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of bids; (iii) Is quick to bid after a legitimate bidder; (iv) Only bids the minimal
amount to stay in front (i.e., only $1 each time); and (v) Commenced bidding
early in the auction, but ceased participation well before the auction ended.
2.4. Shill Bidding Detection
2.4.1. Approaches to Shill Detection and Related Work
Commercial auctioneers claim to have a substantial methodology in place
for detecting shill bidding activity. However, the commercial auctioneers do not
reveal exactly what these measures are to the public. Some auctioneers may
possibly look at a bidders IP address to see whether two or more accounts are
being used to submit bids from the same computer (or the seller and a bidder(s)
are using the same computer). This would indicate that collusion is occurring.
Another approach might be to check bidders feedback records as accounts cre-
ated for the purpose of shill bidding might have limited or no feedback. However,
there seems to be numerous problems with these approaches.
Firstly, checking someone’s IP address over time could be considered a breach
of privacy. Furthermore, a shill bidder may fake her IP address to avoid detec-
tion or frame an innocent person. In addition, it may be the case that the
computer is located in an Internet cafe or a place where the computer is shared.
One person may bid then log off, and then a subsequent person comes along
and uses the same computer to bid. Additionally, computers are dynamically
assigned IP addresses on networks. A shill bidder can get around this method
of detection by disconnecting and then reconnecting his/her computer to the
network. Each time the shill bidder does this, she will be assigned a different
IP address.
With regard to checking feedback, there are generally two instances where
auction participants could be considered suspect:
1. User IDs with zero feedback; and
2. A pattern of the same group of users bidding on different auctions by one
seller.
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However, there are legitimate users with zero feedback (i.e., newly joined
bidders, or those who have not yet won or participated in any auctions). There
are also legitimate reasons that the same group of users might bid on different
auctions by the same seller. If a seller has a good reputation, loyal bidders may
choose to continually deal with the seller. Additionally, an abundance of good
feedback can be misleading as some sellers can engage in a practice referred to
as reputation stacking [8, 17]. Reputation stacking is where the seller creates
multiple bidder accounts and holds a large number of auctions for low-valued
items just for the purpose of generating positive feedback.
One of the first academic approaches to dealing with shill bidding is by Wang
et al. [26, 27]. They suggest that listing fees (referred to as a shill proof fee)
could be used to deter reserve price shilling. Reserve price shilling is a situation
that occurs when a seller is charged a fee based on what the stated reserve
price is. Therefore, a seller will list a lower reserve price to avoid higher fees
and then use shill bids to push the price up. Wang et al.’s proposal charges
a seller an increasing fee based on how far the winning bid is from the reserve
price. The idea is to compel the seller into stating her true reserve price, thereby
eliminating the economic benefits of reserve price shilling. However, this method
is untested and does not apply to auctions without reserve prices.
Most previous work on shill detection in online auctions is based on analysing
large volumes of historical auction data to search for shill patterns. Kauffman
and Wood [9] used a statistical approach to detecting shill bidding behaviours
and showed how the statistical data of a market would look if opportunistic
behaviours do exist. They also showed how to use an empirical model to test
for questionable behaviours. However, one limitation of the approach is the
need to review multiple auctions over a long period of time. Furthermore, since
the statistical approach was based on analyzing a large amount of historical
auction data, it was not applicable to directly analysing a particular auction
where shilling behaviours might be involved.
Chau et al [30] proposed a shill bidding detection method called 2-Level
Fraud Spotting, which can be used to detect fraudsters in online auctions using
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data mining techniques by investigating historical data from eBay auctions.
Xu and Cheng [29] propose an approach to detect shill suspects in concurrent
online auctions (where multiple auctions for identical items are simultaneously
taking place). Their auction model can be formally verified using a model
checker according to a set of behavioural properties specified in pattern-based
linear temporal logic. Dong et al. [31, 32] extend on this work by verifying shill
suspects using Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. They use eBay auction data
to validate whether using Dempster-Shafer theory to combine multiple sources
of evidence of shilling behaviour can reduce the number of false positive results
that would be generated from a single source of evidence. Later, Dong et al. [33]
study the relationship between final prices of online auctions and shill activities
in eBay auctions. They train a neural network using features extracted from
item descriptions, listings and other auction properties. The likelihood of shill
bidding is determined by the aforementioned Dempster-Shafer shill certification
technique. Goel et al. [34] introduce an approach for verifying shill bidders using
a multi-state Bayesian network, which supports reasoning under uncertainty.
They describe how to construct the multi-state Bayesian network and present
formulas for calculating the probabilities of a bidder being a shill and being a
normal bidder.
Some approaches have been proposed to detect shill bidding in real-time
(i.e., while an auction is in progress) [35, 36, 37, 38, 39]. The motivation is
that actions can be taken to penalise the seller or shill bidder before the auction
terminates to ensure that innocent bidders do not become victims. Such ac-
tions can include suspending or cancelling an auction, economic penalties, and
account suspension or cancellation. However, a problem with a purely real-time
shill detection method is that there is insufficient information available from just
one auction. A bidder’s historical behaviour must be to some extent taken into
account to provide sufficient evidence of shill bidding. The real-time proposals
so are merely demonstrations of a method, but lack any sort of testing to prove
their effectiveness. Furthermore, the shill behaviours outlined in these papers
are arbitrary and do not share a consensus amongst the academic community
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about what actually constitutes shill bidding.
Beranek et al. [2] introduce a trust model based on reputation (users evalua-
tion after performed transactions) and on examination of properties of possible
fraudulent behaviour in online auctions. The evidence is expressed and com-
bined using belief functions. Beranek and Knizek [3] extend the fraud detection
approach by using contextual information whose origin is outside online auction
portals. The suggested model integrates information from auctions and relevant
contextual information with the aim to evaluate the behaviour of certain sellers
in an online auction and determine whether it is legal or not. However, this
proposal does not focus specifically on shill bidding.
2.4.2. The Shill Score Reputation System
In previous work [18], we proposed a reputation system that observes a
bidder’s bidding patterns over a series of auctions for a particular seller. The
goal is to obtain statistics regarding a bidder’s conduct with the seller, and
calculate a Shill Score. Potential auction participants can observe other bidders’
Shill Scores to determine the likelihood that any of them are engaging in price-
inflating behaviour.
The Shill Score targets core shill bidding strategies. A shill that deviates
too far from these strategies is less effective, and will not significantly alter the
auction outcome. This approach acts as both a detection mechanism and a
deterrent to shill bidders. To avoid detection, a shill must behave like a normal
bidder, which essentially restricts her ability to engage in shill bidding.
The Shill Score basically works as follows (see [18] for specific details): A
bidder bi, is examined over k auctions held by the same seller for the behaviour
outlined in Section 2.2. Each characteristic of shill behaviour is assigned a
rating, which is combined to form bi’s Shill Score. The Shill Score gives bi a
value between 0 and 10. The closer the Shill Score is to 10, the more likely that
bi is engaging in price-inflating behaviour. The algorithm’s goal is to determine
which bidder(s) is most inclined to be the shill out of a group of l bidders. The
Shill Score behavioural ratings are determined as follows:
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• α Rating - Percentage of auctions bi has participated in.
• β Rating - Percentage of bids bi has made out of all the auctions partic-
ipated in.
• γ Rating - Normalised function based on the auctions bi has won out of
the auctions participated in.
• δ Rating - Normalised inter bid time for bi out of the auctions partici-
pated in.
•  Rating - Normalised inter bid increment for bi out of the auctions
participated in.
• ζ Rating Normalised time bi commences bidding in an auction.
Each rating is between 0 and 1, where the higher the value, the more suspi-
cious the bidder. A bidder’s Shill Score is calculated as the weighted average of
these ratings:
score =
ω1α+ ω2β + ω3γ + ω4δ + ω5+ ω6ζ
ω1 + ω2 + ω3 + ω4 + ω5 + ω6
× 10
where ωi, 1 ≤ ωi ≤ 6, is the weight associated with each rating. Tsang et al [24]
propose what they feel are the optimal selections for weight values. If a bidder
wins an auction, then his/her α, β, δ,  and ζ ratings are 0 for the particular
auction (as the shills goal is to lose).
2.4.3. Shill Bidding Detection Involving Colluding Shill Bidders
The Shill Score (as outlined in [18]) considers only the basic scenario with
one seller and one shill bidder. In the US case described in Section 1 [17],
there were three sellers, which used 40 different aliases (40 shills in effect). The
sellers understood that there was less chance that they would get caught if
they used multiple bidder accounts to take alternating turns at submitting shill
bids. This makes it more difficult for authorities to determine which bidders
are shills, as collusive behaviour allows shill bidders to appear to be more like
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regular bidders. In some cases, geographical proximity can be an indication of
collusion if there are several shills within a close area that participate in the
auction. For example, in the shill case [17], two of the men were from California
and the other was from Colorado. However, this is not a reliable indicator
of shill bidding and may raise privacy concerns, as it requires examining the
registration database for such relationships.
We refer to the strategies a group of shill bidders can engage in as collusive
shill bidding [19, 20]. We investigated approaches to shill bidding involving one
seller who controls multiple shill bidders and what effect this has on the Shill
Score. The main goal of shilling is to drive up the price of an item. In the
situation where there is only one shill bidder, the shill’s secondary goal is to
attempt to do this in such a manner that it minimises her Shill Score. When
there is more than one shill bidder, there are particular strategies that the group
(of shill bidders) can engage in to influence some factors contributing to their
individual Shill Scores. Therefore, the group’s collective goal (secondary to
shilling) is to minimise each member’s Shill Scores.
Despite being able to use more complicated strategies, the group as a whole
must still conform to certain behaviour in order to be effective as a shill. With
regard to the Shill Score, all that shill bidders can do by colluding is to reduce
their α and β ratings. The γ, δ,  and ζ ratings are still indicative of shill
bidding. For example, none of the colluding shill bidders will be inclined to win
an auction. Furthermore, it is still in the group’s interests to bid quickly, and
by minimal amounts to influence the selling price. Therefore, inter bid times
and increments will be consistent for all shill bidders. Shill bidders will also bid
early in an auction and cease bidding well before the end of an auction.
There appear to be three possible strategies that can be employed by collud-
ing shill bidders. The first strategy is referred to as the alternating bid strategy.
Two (or more) colluding shill bidders each take alternating turns at bidding,
e.g., shill1 bids, then shill2 bids, then shill1 bids again, etc. Table 2 presents
an example of the alternating bid strategy. Here there are three bidders, de-
noted b1, b2 and b3 respectively. b1 is a legitimate bidder, but b2 and b3 are shill
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Table 2: An example auction with two colluding shill bidders alternating their bids in order
to reduce suspicion.
Bid # bid Price Time
15 b1 $35 20:03
14 b2 (Shill) $32 12:44
13 b1 $31 12:42
12 b3 (Shill) $26 5:05
11 b1 $25 5:02
10 b2 (Shill) $21 2:47
9 b1 $20 2:45
8 b3 (Shill) $15 1:07
7 b1 $14 1:05
6 b2 (Shill) $9 0:47
5 b1 $8 0:45
4 b3 (Shill) $6 0:20
3 b1 $5 0:19
2 b2 (Shill) $2 0:06
1 b1 $1 0:05
bidders. b2 and b3 take alternating turns at outbidding b1. This strategy has
the effect of lowering b2 and b3’s β ratings (i.e., the number of individual shill
bids in an auction), but does not affect their α ratings.
The second strategy is for colluding shills to take turns at shilling for a
particular auction (referred to as the alternating auction strategy). For example,
given two auctions, shill1 will bid exclusively in auction1, while shill2 bids only
in auction2. This strategy lowers the shills’ α ratings (i.e., number of auctions
participated in), but does not affect their β ratings.
The third strategy is to use a combination of the alternating bid and alternat-
ing auction strategies (referred to as the hybrid strategy). The hybrid strategy
can be used to alter the group’s α and β ratings between the two extremes. An
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example of a hybrid strategy would be for shill1 and shill2 to alternately bid
in auction1, shill3 and shill4 alternately bid in auction2, then shill1 and shill3
alternately bid in auction3, etc. This continues until all combinations of bidders
have been used, and then the process repeats. In reality, colluding shills would
probably employ a hybrid strategy.
In [19, 20] we describe how to extend the Shill Score to detect collusive shill
bidding behaviour using a Collusion Score. While the details this approach are
outside the scope of this paper, the purpose of this discussion is to highlight
how differing collusive behaviours can be used in an attempt to influence the
Shill Score.
A limitation of our collusive shill bidding proposal is that it only focused
on one seller who controls multiple shill bidders. There is no literature that
addresses the situation where multiple sellers are in collusion and what strategies
they can engage in. In this paper we refer to this scenario as multiple seller
collusive shill bidding.
3. Shill Bidding Detection Involving Multiple Seller Accounts
This section describes the behaviours and strategies multiple colluding sellers
can use to engage in shill bidding and what affect this has on the Shill Score. We
then present an algorithm that takes into account multiple seller collusive shill
bidding strategies and adjusts the Shill Score for a specific bidder appropriately
to remove any advantage that seller collusion may have.
3.1. Multiple Collusive Seller Shill Bidding Behaviour and Tactics
The goal of this paper is to address shill bidding strategies that a seller could
engage in if she has control of multiple seller accounts. In order to narrow the
scope of the problem, we restrict our attention to the case where there are two
or more sellers in collusion, but they only control one shill bidder. That is, we
are ignoring instances where the colluding sellers control multiple shill bidding
accounts (this will be the focus of future work).
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Let the set of all bidders in the auction dataset be
B = {b1, b2, . . . , bl}
where bi denotes the ith bidder and 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
The set of all sellers is
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm}
where sj denotes the jth seller account and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
The set of all auctions in the dataset is
A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}
where n (n ≥ 0) is the total number of auctions.
The set of auctions conducted by seller sj is
Aj = {aj1, aj2, . . . , ajk}
where Aj ⊆ A and k (0 ≤ k ≤ n) is the total number of auctions conducted
by sj . Each sellers’ auctions forms a partition over A. That is, A = A
1 ∪ A2 ∪
· · · ∪Aj and Ai ∩Aj = {}, i 6= j, where each A is pairwise disjoint.
Let us denote a seller engaging in collusive shill bidding behaviour as Sshill.
Sshill controls a series of w (0 ≤ w ≤ n) seller accounts. The challenge is to
determine which subset of seller accounts in S are controlled by Sshill. We will
denote the colluding seller accounts as the set S where S
′ ⊆ S.
Consider the case where Sshill is using two colluding seller accounts S =
{s1, s2}, and controls a single shill bidder bs (bs ∈ B). If bs were to participate
entirely in auctions held by s1, then bs’s Shill Score will be high for s1, but 0 for
s2. This is due to the α rating being high in s1’s auctions, but 0 in s2’s auctions
as bs has not participated in any auctions held by s2. The same holds true if
the situation is reversed and bs participates in auctions held by s2 and does not
participate in s1’s auctions (i.e., a high α rating for s2, but a 0 α rating for s1).
Now consider the case where Sshill is using two colluding seller accounts
S = {s1, s2}, and is conducting a total of four auctions (two per seller). That
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is, the set of auctions held by s1 is A
1 = {a11, a12}, and the set of auctions held
by s2 is A
2 = {a21, a22}. In order to reduce the impact of bs’s α rating, the best
strategy for Sshill is to alternate bs evenly between the two seller’s auctions.
That is, use bs in some auctions held by s1 and s2, but do not use bs for all
auctions held by s1 or s2. The optimal sequences are as follows:
Sequence 1 Sequence 2
a11 – Contains shill bidding a
1
1 – No shill bidding
a12 – No shill bidding a
1
2 – Contains shill bidding
a21 – Contains shill bidding a
2
1 – No shill bidding
a22 – No shill bidding a
2
2 – Contains shill bidding
Sequence 3 Sequence 4
a11 – Contains shill bidding a
1
1 – No shill bidding
a12 – No shill bidding a
1
2 – Contains shill bidding
a21 – No shill bidding a
2
1 – Contains shill bidding
a22 – Contains shill bidding a
2
2 – No shill bidding
Using such a sequence to evenly distribute bs’s shill bidding activity out
across the auctions held by s1 and s2 reduces bs’s α rating for any particular
seller. That is, the average number of auctions participated in per seller is
lower, therefore suspicion is lower on bs for each particular seller. We refer to
this approach as the alternating seller strategy. That is, Sshill is alternating bs
evenly across each of the auctions by s1 and s2 in order to avoid detection and
reduce suspicion.
Now let’s scale up the problem to three sellers S = {s1, s2, s3}, who are
hosting the following respective auctions A1 = {a11, a12, a13}, A2 = {a21, a22, a23},
A3 = {a31, a32, a33}. To evenly reduce suspicion on bs for each particular seller,
Sshill can use any variation of the following sequence a11, a
2
2, a
3
3 provided that
bs only participates in an even number of auctions from each seller. The less
number of auctions bs participates in from each seller, the better.
However, the effect of the α rating in the Shill Score becomes more obscure
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if there are an uneven number of auctions conducted by each seller. Consider
three sellers s1, s2 and s3, who are hosting the following respective auctions A
1 =
{a11, a12}, A2 = {a21, a22, a23}, A3 = {a31, a32, a33, a34, a35}. Assume that Sshill employs
the following sequence of alternating auctions a11, a
2
1, a
3
1. bs’s α rating will be
high for s1, medium for s2, and low for s3. This is due to the α rating looking
at the percentage of auctions for a particular seller that bs has participated in.
For each respective seller this will be s1−50%, s2−33.3%, and s3−20%. Logic
might seem to suggest to not shill in s1’s auctions, which in this case means
that the Shill Score has done its job by disrupting the usual business of shill
bidding. If bs is transferred from to a
1
1 to perhaps a
3
2 as s3 has a greater number
of auctions, then s3’s α rating will jump up to 40%, which is also an undesirable
outcome.
It seems that the optimal approach for the alternating seller strategy is
to host an even number of auctions for each sj ∈ S′ , and evenly alternate bs
between each seller. The lower the number of auctions participated in, the lower
the impact of the rating. As such it appears that the effect of the Shill Score
in its current form on multiple seller collusive shill bidding is as follows:
1. Participate like a regular shill bidder and shill in all auctions across all
seller accounts, and bs will have a high Shill Score for all sellers she has
been involved with;
2. Alternately, shill in an ad hoc manner in some auctions across some/all
seller accounts, and bs will have a high Shill Score for some sellers and a
lower Shill Score for other sellers. But ultimately, there will be substantial
evidence of shill bidding; or
3. Host an even number of auctions across all seller accounts, and alternate
bs evenly across all sj ∈ S′ , then evenly reduce the suspicion on bs for all
sellers bs has been involved with.
Therefore, the Shill Score has done its job for the first two cases. It is the
third case that needs addressing. Clearly the Shill Score is successful in that it
forces Sshill to change her behaviour by expending more effort to open multiple
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accounts, reducing the number of auctions with shill bidding, and going to
careful lengths to avoid detection. The main advantage Sshill has is to influence
the Shill Score’s α rating (i.e., the percentage of sellers auctions the bidder
has participated in). The remaining Shill Score ratings (i.e., β, γ, δ, , ζ)
are unaffected by the alternating seller strategy (provided the aforementioned
assumption is in place where we are only dealing with one shill bidder being used
across multiple sellers). The remainder of this section discusses an algorithm
that accounts for the alternating seller strategy in an attempt to remove any
remaining advantage Sshill might have by engaging in such an approach to shill
bidding.
3.2. The Seller Collusion Algorithm
In this section we propose the Seller Collusion Algorithm. The algorithm is
designed to achieve the following goals:
1. Identify potential colluding groups of sellers;
2. Ascertain the likelihood that shill bidding is occurring within the colluding
group of sellers; and
3. Account for the influence on the rating for a specific bidders Shill Score
by proportionally adjusting the ratings weight.
The Seller Collusion Algorithm has six distinct steps:
1. Identify which sellers’ auctions bi has participated in;
2. Determine which sellers have an association based on their dealings with bi
and construct a Seller Association Graph;
3. Determine which sellers are most likely to be colluding based on bi’s dealings
with the suspect sellers and construct a Shill Bidding Association Graph;
4. For each seller in a group of suspected colluding sellers, calculate bi’s Mod-
ified Shill Score (i.e., remove the α rating from consideration);
5. Check the similarities between each Modified Shill Score to determine the
likelihood the sellers are operating in a group, and that they are engaging
in shill bidding; and
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6. Based on a severity measure (i.e., the extent that it is likely that shill
bidding is occurring), proportionally adjust the α rating and recalculate
bi’s Shill Score.
The following sections outline the specifics of each step in our proposed
algorithm to combat multiple seller collusive shill bidding.
3.2.1. Step 1 – Identify which sellers a bidder has been involved with
Step one in the Seller Collusion Algorithm is to identify which sellers bi has
been involved with, and for each identified seller, count how many of the seller’s
auctions bi has participated in. This refers to only whether the bidder has bid
in any of the seller’s auctions, not how many bids have been submitted in a
particular auction.
Table 3: Example data for possible seller collusion - the number of times each bidder partici-
pated in each sellers auctions.
Sellers
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Bidders
b1 3 40 30 2 0 0
b2 0 0 2 43 25 30
b3 0 16 18 0 5 0
Table 3 presents an example of test data that will be used to help describe
the Seller Collusion Algorithm. There are three bidders B = {b1, b2, b3} and
six sellers S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6}. b1 has participated in 3 auctions by s1, 40
auctions by s2, 30 auctions by s3, 2 auctions by s4, and no auctions held by
s5 and s6. Similarly, Table 1 outlines the dealings b2 and b3 have had with the
sellers in S.
3.2.2. Step 2 – Determine which sellers have an association based on their deal-
ings with a bidder
Step two in the Seller Collusion Algorithm is to identify potential groups
of suspected colluding sellers. To do this we use the Seller Association Graph
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(SAG)
SAG = (V,E)
where V is the set of all vertices (i.e., the sellers) and E is the set of edges
(i.e., an association between sellers). One Seller Association Graph SAGi, is
generated for each bidder bi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ l). Each seller is a vertex v in
the graph. For two sellers sj , sk (where j, k > 0, j 6= k), an edge e will exist
between their vertices vj and vk, if the bidder has participated in both of their
auctions. Note that this is not restricted to mean concurrent participation (i.e.,
the auctions are running at the same time), but any historical participation.
Figure 1: Example Seller Association Graphs illustrating which sellers each bidder has had
dealings with.
Figure 1 shows the Seller Association Graphs generated based on the data
in Table 3. SAG1, SAG2 and SAG3, correspond to b1, b2 and b3 respectively.
Figure 2: Seller Association Graphs with weighted vertices to depict how many of each sellers
auctions a bidder has participated in.
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Once each seller association graph SAGi has been defined, the respective
vertices are weighted based on the number of sj ’s auctions bi has participated
in (Figure 2). For example, in SAG1, b1 has participated in 3 of s1’s auctions,
therefore s1’s vertex is weighted as 3, etc.
3.2.3. Step 3 – Identify potential groups of suspected colluding sellers
Step three in the Seller Collusion Algorithm is to determine which of the
identified sellers are most likely to be in collusion with each other. The purpose
of this step is to “weed out” more innocent sellers who might have had few (or
significantly less) dealings with bi compared to more suspicious seller cliques.
In order to identify possible colluding seller groups, each edge of the Seller
Association Graph is given a weighting. The weighting examines how similar
(or dissimilar) each pair of sellers are in terms of the number of auctions bi has
participated in with them. The first operation is to compare how far the number
of auctions is from the mean number of auctions for two particular sellers sj ,
sk:
a = (nj − n¯)
b = (nk − n¯)
where is n¯ is the average of the auctions held by all the sellers in SAGi, and
nj and nk are the values of the vertices for sj and sk respectively. Note that if
a or b = 0 (i.e., they are equal to n¯), then a or b are set to 1 to avoid division
by 0 in the next equation. The following equation is used to generate the edge
weighting ej,k for sj and sk:
ej,k =
a
|a| +
b
|b| − 1
a
|a| +
b
|b| + 1
In addition to similarities in the auctions participated in, this equation also
identifies groups of sellers who have constituted a large portion of a bidder’s
auctions. That is, sellers with a large number of similar participation quotas
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are more suspicious than similar sellers with whom bi has only participated in
their auctions a small number of times. The equation will produce a value of 1
for sellers with a strong association, or -1 for sellers with a weak association.
Figure 3: Seller Association Graphs with weighted edges to gauge how strong the association
is between groups of sellers based on the number of auctions a bidder has participated in with
them.
Figure 3 shows the example Seller Association Graphs highlighting suspicious
seller cliques based the edge weighting metric (i.e., those edges and vertices in
bold, with an edge weighting of 1).
Those sellers which are identified as suspected colluding sellers are then
added to a new graph we refer to as the Shill Bidding Association Graph
(SBAG).
SBAG = (V,E)
where V is a set of sellers and E is a set of edges between sellers.
The corresponding Shill Bidding Association Graph for SAGi is denoted as
SBAGi. The non-suspect sellers’ vertices and all vertex and edge weightings
from SAGi are discarded in SBAGi. However, SBAGi maintains all the vertices
and edges for the suspect sellers that were identified in SAGi.
Figure 4 presents examples of the Shill Bidding Association Graphs. SBAG1,
SBAG2 and SBAG3, correspond to b1, b2, and b3 respectively.
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Figure 4: Shill Bidding Association Graphs highlighting sellers with strong associations and
with vertex weightings removed.
3.2.4. Step 4 – Calculate Modified Shill Scores to produce evidence of seller
collusion
Step four in the Seller Collusion Algorithm is to calculate bi’s Shill Score
for each suspected colluding seller. This will indicate which sellers are likely to
have shill bidding occurring in their auctions. We would expect that a bidder
who was engaging in shill bidding for a seller would have a high Shill Score.
Furthermore, we would expect that the bidder would have a consistently high
Shill Score across all suspect sellers in a clique.
However, given that the goal of multiple seller collusive shill bidding is to
reduce the effect of the shill bidder’s α rating, the Shill Score in its current form
is unreliable. Instead, a Modified Shill Score (MSS) is used which removes the α
rating during the calculation of the Shill Score. That is, the MSS is calculated
as though bi had only participated in sj ’s auctions. Each vertex in SBAGi is
then weighted with bi’s MSS for the particular seller.
Figure 5 presents examples of Shill Bidding Association Graphs with the
vertices weighted based on the bidder’s MSS for each particular seller. In the
example, the sellers in SBAG1 appear highly suspicious.
3.2.5. Step 5 – Classify the severity of suspected colluding sellers
Step five in the Seller Collusion Algorithm is to classify a suspected colluding
group of sellers based on the severity of shill bidding that has occurred during
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Figure 5: Shill Bidding Association Graphs with Modified Shill Score weightings added to the
vertices.
their auctions (i.e., those auctions for which the suspected bidder has been
involved). A shill bidder is likely to have the same bidding pattern across all
auctions in which they are participating. Therefore, we would expect the MSS
to be similar across all auctions for the shill bidder. Sellers for which bi has a
high MSS can be deemed suspect. Furthermore, sellers for which a bidder has
a very similar MSS can also be considered suspicious. Sellers that fall into this
category warrant further investigation.
During step four, we compare the bi’s MSS for each seller. Firstly, we can
remove any sj from SBAGi if bi’s MSS is below 4 for sj ’s auctions as there is
little evidence that shill bidding is occurring despite being identified as being
part of a clique.
Figure 6: Shill Bidding Association Graphs with sellers removed who have a Modified Shill
Score below 5.
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Figure 6 shows that SBAG2 can now be discarded as the b2 has a very
low Shill Score for the auctions held by s4, s5 and s6. SBAG3 illustrates the
situation where the Shill Score for b3 is below the threshold of 5 for s2, but is
above 4 for s3. In this case s2’s vertex is dropped from SBAG3.
For all sellers that remain in the SBAGi we want to compare how similar
their MSS scores are. To do this determine what the median MSS is for the
group. The median is denoted as med. For a given seller’s vertex vi the following
occurs:
If vi < med− 0.5 or > med+ 0.5, then discard
Figure 7: Final Shill Bidding Association Graphs highlighting sellers that are highly suspicious.
The remaining sellers in SBAGi are now those who have sufficiently high
MSSs which are relatively similar. Therefore, these sellers have the most likeli-
hood of engaging in the alternating seller strategy (Figure 7). SBAG3 has only
one vertex remaining. As a seller cannot be in collusion with herself, SBAG3
can also be entirely discarded. However, SGAG1 shows a strong association
between s2 and s3.
3.2.6. Step 6 – Adjust the α rating of suspected shill bidders
As previously mentioned, seller collusion is a way of avoiding shill bidding
detection. The seller directly tries to influence the α rating of the Shill Score
by increasing the number of sellers bi participates in auctions with. As such,
the higher the likelihood of seller collusion, the less we can rely on bi’s α rating.
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Step six in the Seller Collusion Algorithm is to adjust the α rating on bi’s Shill
Score and recalculate for the remaining vertices in SBAGi.
In the original Shill Score each rating is given a weighting that influences
how important the particular characteristic of shill bidding is in terms of cal-
culating the Shill Score. The α rating is weighted by ω1 in the Shill Score. To
mitigate against the effect of the alternating seller strategy, we need to reduce
the influence of the α rating. This is achieved by proportionally reducing ω1
based on how high the MSSi is for bi in sj ’s auctions. That is, the higher MSSi
the lower ω1 is for bi’s α rating.
The first operation in achieving this outcome is to alter bi’s MSS so that it
is between 0 and 1:
MSSi = MSSi/10
Next, let ω
′
1 denote the scaling factor to reduce ω1 by. ω
′
1 is calculated as
follows:
ω
′
1 = 1−MSSi
Finally, the original Shill Score is recalculated for bi with the influence of
the α rating being reduced by ω1/ω
′
1:
score =
(ω1/ω
′
1)α+ ω2β + ω3γ + ω4δ + ω5+ ω6ζ
ω1 + ω2 + ω3 + ω4 + ω5 + ω6
× 10
Figure 8 illustrates the final results for the Seller Collusion Algorithm with
the example data. SBAG2 and SBAG3 have been removed from consideration
as there will little evidence of seller collusion. The remaining sellers in SBAG1
have had b1’s α rating adjusted to account for strong evidence of collusion. As
such b1’s Shill Score with regard to these s2 and s3 increases as the influence of
collusion on the rating is scaled down in the Shill Score.
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Figure 8: Final Shill Bidding Association Graphs with a recalculated Shill Score adjusted for
seller collusion.
4. Performance
4.1. Test Setup
Testing the performance of any shill bidding detection technique is difficult.
As such, many shill bidding detection proposals overlook the testing stage, there-
fore their effectiveness cannot be ascertained. Using data from commercial auc-
tion sites is ultimately the best test. However, most auction sites are reluctant
to supply auction data for privacy reasons and fear of lost reputation if it were
discovered that shill bidding is occurring in their auctions. Even if commercial
auction data can be obtained it is still unknown if shill bidding definitely occurs
as shill bidders generally are not forthcoming about their behaviour.
The aforementioned testing problems are further exacerbated when looking
for seller collusion in auction data. As this our work is the first to look into
collusive behaviour, significantly larger datasets are required for testing. That
is, potentially 1,000 of auctions involving numerous bidders and sellers.
Previously, we have undertaken two approaches to testing. One is to hold
simulated auctions (on a purpose-built auction server) involving human users
bidding for fake items with fake money. The users did not have any idea that
there was a shill bidder in the auctions inflating the price. However, this ap-
proach is time consuming to arrange and to continually monitor the auctions.
Additionally, such an approach may not necessarily capture all of the real-world
auctioning behaviours and strategies as real money and items are not involved.
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If this approach were to be used to test the Seller Collusion Algorithm, the
auctions could potentially involve participants in both seller and bidder roles.
During the auctions a small number of sellers would be asked to engage in
seller collusion. They would not be instructed how they must do this. Once all
auctions were completed the Seller Collusion Algorithm could be run against
all generated auction data. However, the issues of the size of the test data
set required and the amount of effort to organise the auctions really limit the
viability of this approach.
The second approach to testing is to use software bidding agents to generate
synthetic auction data. Previously, we have proposed a Simple Shill Bidding
Agent [21] and an Adaptive Shill Bidding Agent [40] that were programed to
engage in typical shill bidding strategies. These agents were pitted against a
set of “Zero-Intelligence” bidding agents whose sole purpose was to randomly
commence bidding up to their randomly allocated bidding limit throughout an
auction. While this approach automates the testing process and can generate
large amounts of data sets, the problem was that we were programming the
very behaviour we were expecting. As such, the shill detection mechanism was
bound to uncover the shill bidders who were perpetrating this behaviour.
Recently, Tsang et al. [23] extended upon our work and created a more
sophisticated tool to generate synthetic auction data. Their approach was cal-
ibrated against data collected from the New Zealand auction site, Trade Me,
and can reproduce the statistical qualities of the auction data indicative to that
of real data sets from Trade Me.
To assist with development of the Seller Collusion Algorithm, we developed
the Multiple Seller Collusive Shill Bidding Simulator. This allows a user to
manually or automatically input various scenarios to automate the process of
running the algorithm. The simulator undertakes all of the calculations and pro-
vides visual output of each stage of the algorithm to ensure that the calculations
are being performed accurately.
The simulator was also used as the front end for processing the synthetic
auction data for the purposes of undertaking the tests.
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Figure 9: Multiple Seller Collusive Shill Bidding Simulator.
4.2. Results and Analysis
The following four tests were conducted with regard to the Seller Collusion
Algorithm:
1. How the proposed detection mechanism performs against a baseline of reg-
ular auctions that do not contain shill bidding (see Figure 10(a)).
2. How the Seller Collusion Algorithm performs on auctions involving collud-
ing groups of sellers who engage in the alternating seller strategy to avoid
detection (see Figure 10(b)).
3. The impacts on Shill Scores and the operation of the Seller Collusion Al-
gorithm when the shill bidder is not evenly alternated between the sellers’
auctions (see Figure 10(c)).
4. Comparison between baseline Shill Scores and recalculated Shill Scores us-
ing the Seller Collusion Algorithm (see Figure 10(d)).
Furthermore, we generate a simulated auction dataset using a shill bidding
agent [21]. The dataset contains 10 sellers, 51 bidders (including a shill bidder
(e.g., ‘Shill a’)), and 30 auctions. We applied the dataset on the seller collusion
algorithm and compared the algorithm with collusion score approach [19]. Fig-
ure 11 shows the comparative analysis results. Figure 11(a) presents that all
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(a) Shill scores in auctions without shill
bidding
(b) Shill scores using the alternating auc-
tion strategy
(c) Shill scores not using the alternating
auction strategy
(d) Baseline shill scores versus seller collu-
sion algorithm shill score
Figure 10: Simulated Test Results.
bidders show normal bidding behaviour (including ‘Shill a’). Figure 11(b) illus-
trates that all bidders show regular bidding patterns except ‘Shill a’ (red-filled
circle). This indicates that the seller collusion algorithm performs better than
collusion score approach.
We also analysed the bidding patterns of ‘Shill a’ and found that ‘Shill a’
achieved the highest MSSs for the sellers (e.g., ‘seller a’, ‘seller b’, ‘seller c’,
and ‘seller d’) she participated in (see Figure 12). This indicates that ‘seller a’,
‘seller b’, ‘seller c’, and ‘seller d’ are the colluding sellers who engaged ‘Shill a’
for price-inflating behaviour.
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(a) Collusion Score [19]
(b) Seller collusion algorithm
Figure 11: Comparative Analysis Results.
5. Conclusion
This paper presented an approach to detect shilling bidding where multiple
sellers are working in collusion with each other (i.e., multiple collusive seller shill
bidding). In order to rein in the scope of the problem, this paper only focused on
the situation where there are two or more colluding sellers who control one shill
bidder. We described the strategies colluding sellers could employ to reduce
the amount of suspicion raised by shill bidding through alternating the shill
bidder evenly across their auctions. We referred to the optimal approach as
the alternating seller strategy. By engaging in the alternating seller strategy,
the sellers can influence the rating used when calculating the shill bidders Shill
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Figure 12: MSSs of ‘Shill a’ for the sellers she participated in.
Score.
The approach to detect multiple collusive seller shill bidding outlined in
this paper accomplishes two goals. Firstly, we are able to potentially ascertain
colluding groups of sellers employing the alternating seller strategy. This is
achieved by identifying the sellers a bidder has been associated with (using the
Seller Association Graph), determining potential cliques of sellers who might
be engaging in shill bidding (using the Shill Bidding Association Graph), calcu-
lating a bidders Modified Shill Score for each of the sellers (i.e., removing the
rating), and ranking their likelihood of collusion. Secondly, we are able to ac-
count for the alternating seller strategy, and recalculate the bidders Shill Scores
for each seller. This allows the Shill Score reputation system to remain a deter-
rent to those attempting to engage in shill bidding. The information gathered
by the Seller Collusion Algorithm could be supplied to auction houses, allowing
them to monitor or take action against suspected sellers (i.e., warning auction
participants, suspending/cancelling user accounts, suspending/cancelling auc-
tions, economic penalties, legal action).
Performance has been tested using simulated auction data and experimental
results are presented. The tests examined how the proposed detection mecha-
nism performs against a baseline of regular auctions that do not contain shill
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bidding. We then compared how our approach performed on auctions involving
colluding groups of sellers who engage in the alternating seller strategy to avoid
detection. Finally, we investigated the effects of seller collusion whereby the shill
bidder was not evenly alternated between the sellers auctions. This algorithm
has yet to be tested against live auction data.
Future work involves investigating strategies collusive sellers can engage in
whereby they control more than one shill bidder. That is, combining the work
presented in this paper with the work into collusive shill bidding [19, 20]. This
will significantly increase the complexity of the problem and the amount of auc-
tion data required for testing, but the goal is to create a well-rounded approach
to shill bidding detection that focuses on all shill bidding strategies. Finally,
we plan to expand the Shill Score to operate in live auctions so that real-time
actions can be taken against shill bidding perpetrators.
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